News stories for Representative Cases
Appellate Decisions in Representative Cases
St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L. by & through Loveland, 2014 CO 33, 325 P.3d 1014 (Colo. 2014) Nine-year-old student and her parents brought action against school district and district employee for negligent supervision and premises liability in connection with injuries sustained by student when she fell from "zip line" apparatus on public school playground.
Wilson v. City of Lafayette, No. 07CV-02248PAB-BNB, 2010 WL 1291518 (D. Colo. Mar. 29, 2010) Under Colorado law, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a warning issued for a TASER device was sufficient, precluded summary judgment in a products liability action.
Bullock v. Daimler Trucks N. Am., LLC, No. 08-CV-00491-PAB-MEH, 2009 WL 6315339 (D. Colo. May 19, 2009) report and recommendation adopted, No. 08-CV-00491-PAB-MEH, 2010 WL 1286079 (D. Colo. Mar. 29, 2010) Deceased truck driver's wife's allegation that manufacturer knew of the vehicle's safety concerns and failed to test them provided prima facie proof of a triable issue of exemplary damages with regard to the manufacturer of the sleeper compartment, and thus, the wife was given leave to amend her compliant.
Lemery v. Beckner, 323 F. App'x 644 (10th Cir. 2009) Plaintiff struck in the eye by a pepper ball shot by a police officer was momentarily stopped before running away, and thus, there was governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied, such that the plaintiff was "seized" for purposes of his Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.
Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2007) Law was clearly established that it was not reasonable for officer to use TASER immediately and without warning upon arriving on scene of struggle between another officer and misdemeanant, and, thus, officer was not qualifiedly immune from plaintiff's civil rights claim for excessive force under Fourth Amendment.
Adams ex rel. Adams v. City of Westminster, 140 P.3d 8 (Colo. App. 2005) City employee's action against city for breach of contract and promissory estoppel regarding city's alleged failure to provide fringe benefits was not barred by Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA); nature of alleged injury arose from terms of contract of employment, employee did not claim damages for personal harms or injuries, and employee had not sought redress for injuries resulting from tortious conduct.